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 Airport financial management and meeting airport break-even need are essential 
to securing airport financial strength.  Airports face challenges during events such as 
September 11th, which have the potential to impact their ability to generate reliable 
airline related revenue and maintain airport financial strength.  Research is conducted 
through a literature review of a case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 
books, scholarly articles, Government Accountability Office (GAO) documents, and 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) documents in order to describe basic airport 
financial management, airport sources of revenue, and airport revenues related to 
airline operations.  The discussion focuses specifically on whether or not September 
11th, the economic recessions from March-November 2001 and December 2007-June 
2009, and reductions in American Airlines’ hub service in 2003 and 2009 affected the 
financial strength of Lambert by examining Lambert’s Operations, Revenue, AIP 
Funding, and Passenger Facility Charges from 1999-2013.   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Airport financial prosperity requires a well-balanced airport financial management 
strategy.  Executing the strategy is critical when it comes to meeting the airport’s break-
even need and securing the airport’s financial strength in terms of credit ratings.  Break-
even need is the amount of revenue an airport requires on an annual basis produced by 
user charges, lease rentals, and concessions in order to pay for airport expenditures 
such as capital investments and operational costs (Young & Wells, 2011).  According to 
the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE, 2011), “Airports are highly 
complex organizations to manage.  An airport is the agent of public service, a business, 
a community resource, and an essential stakeholder to commerce” (AAAE, 2011, p. 9).  
Airport managers use financial management methodologies to maintain this balance in 
airport financial accounting practices, especially when managing contracts and revenue 
calculations related to the airlines that serve their airport. 
These methodologies are tailored to meet the specific needs of a specific airport.  
The rights and responsibilities of the airport and the airlines are outlined in a contract 
known across the aviation industry as an airport use agreement (Young & Wells, 2011).  
Airport managers often make adjustments to their financial management methodology 
when there are fluctuations in the revenues the airport depends upon as part of their 
use agreements (Young & Wells, 2011).  These methodologies provide airport 
managers with an effective way of managing the financial resources available to them 
for their particular airport’s operations, maintenance, and improvements (Young & 
Wells, 2011).  Often times, airports are able to generate their own revenue, which 
provides enough for operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses such as salaries 
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and utilities, but when an improvement project such as terminal expansion or runway 
construction may become necessary, capital improvement expenses are incurred.  At 
that point in time, supplemental funding from federal, state, local resources and airlines 
is often needed (Young & Wells, 2011).  With all of this fiscal responsibility, it is clear 
that an airport must be run as diligently as possible.     
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CHAPTER 2 – STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to describe basic airport financial management, 
airport sources of revenue, and fluctuations in airport revenues related to airline 
operations. Specifically, it provides a case study of Lambert St. Louis International 
Airport to discuss whether or not September 11
th
, the economic recessions from March 
- November 2001 and from December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009 
reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert affected the airport’s financial 
strength.  Airline operation fluctuations, and related revenue fluctuations were being 
watched by credit rating agencies as the airport was trying to complete its 2005 runway 
project.  These fluctuations will also be discussed with regard to the effect on the 
airport’s financial strength.     
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
Research Question 
Have major external events (September 11
th
, the economic recessions from 
March – November 2001 and from December 2007 – June 2009, or the 2003 and 2009 
reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert) affected the financial strength 
of Lambert St. Louis International Airport?  According to the United States Government 
Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), “A good indicator of airports’ financial strength is the 
number and scale of underlying bond ratings provided by bond-rating agencies” (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14).    
In order to answer the research questions, this study begins with a literature 
review of books, scholarly articles, Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
documents, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) documents in order to provide a 
basic understanding of airport financial management and to identify main sources of 
airport revenue.  Next, information will be provided from the case study of Lambert that 
discusses the effects of September 11
th
, the economic recessions from March – 
November 2001 and December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009 American 
Airlines’ reductions of hub service had on the airport.  Finally, data will be plotted from 
the FAA to show Lambert’s airline operations numbers compared to national operations 
numbers, as well as Lambert’s airport revenues, Airport Improvement Program (AIP) 
funding, and Passenger Facility Charges (PFC’s) from 1999 - 2013 in line graphs.  
These graphs provide a visual representation to analyze the fluctuations of those 
variables as a result of the events of September 11
th
, the economic recessions, and the 
2003 and 2009 reductions in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert. 
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CHAPTER 4 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Airport Financial Management 
Airport financial management is a complex topic, and many factors must be 
considered.  “Most U.S. airports are operated as independent, not-for-profit entities with 
oversight by a politically-appointed authority, or as self-sustaining enterprise funds of a 
governmental entity such as a county, city, or state government” (Airport Cooperative 
Research Program, 2007, p. 6)  This is a proprietary function of government which 
means to act as a private enterprise  (AAAE, 2011).  “Airport finance is a multilayered 
partnership among several levels of government as well as between the public and 
private sectors” (Kaps, 2000, p. 263.)  Working in this partnership to ensure an airport 
has sufficient revenue to meet break-even need can be a challenge as federal, state, 
and local budgets fluctuate. “One of the constraints in the public sector is the fund 
structure.  Public budgeting is based on ‘funds’- that is, separate accounts for separate 
purposes” (Rubin, 2010, p. 24.)  This can make it difficult for airport managers as airport 
revenues must at least break even with expenditures, but exceeding the expenditures is 
even better.  
Airport expenses can be broken into two broad categories which are:  operation 
and maintenance (O&M) costs and capital improvement expenses (Young & Wells, 
2011).  The O&M costs are those that occur regularly and are required to keep the 
airport running smoothly while maintaining the present level of operations at the airport.  
The O&M costs consist of expenses such as utilities, airport employee salaries, and the 
acquisition of supplies ranging from something as costly as airfield lights to the minute 
cost of something such as paper clips (Young & Wells, 2011).    
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On the other hand, capital improvement expenses are considered the largest 
expenses for an airport.  Capital improvement at an airport consists of large scale 
projects that carry a heavy financial burden.  This can include the acquisition of new 
land, construction projects such as the expansion of terminal buildings or the extension 
of runways as previously mentioned, and even updating firefighting facilities and 
procurement of new fire fighting vehicles (Young & Wells, 2011).  Most often, airports 
are able to pay their own O&M costs, and then exhaust all non-local avenues of funding 
such as the AIP funding, PFCs and any other federal, state, and local grants for 
improvement projects, and then as a last source of funding, issue debt instruments 
such as bonds to pay for the remainder of the projects from the proceeds of those 
bonds (Kaps, 2000).  Fortunately for airport managers, federal, state, or local funding is 
often available and used to subsidize the majority of the costs of the capital 
improvement expenses.    
Federal Financial Resources 
National Airport Capital Needs 
After World War II, air travel in the United States became very popular, resulting 
in a significant increase in demand on the nation’s airports.  Continuity of airports to 
support commercial air travel became a necessity, and the concept of a system of 
airports was born and combined with the federal funding to support those airports 
(Young & Wells, 2011).  The ideology first began in 1946 with the Federal Airport Act, 
and the first official national plan was developed for the system of airports across the 
United States.  It was called the National Airport Plan (NAP), and it directed how federal 
funds would be allocated to the airports included (Young & Wells, 2011).  
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Subsequently, the NAP was required annually by law, which meant that there were 
multiple updates, leading up to the National Airport System Plan (NASP), established in 
1970 (Young & Wells, 2011).   
The NASP was established by the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, 
that provided a more detailed approach to determining airport eligibility for federal 
funding, and it categorized airports in order to determine their eligibility for funding 
according to the number of annual enplanements (the number of passengers boarding 
aircraft) and the type of services provided at each airport (Young & Wells, 2011).  Also, 
as an integral part of the Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970, the Airport and 
Airway Trust Fund was established, that accrues funds by means of charging user fees, 
attaching taxes to fuel, and by generation of other miscellaneous revenues.  The trust 
was designed to provide funding specifically for the maintenance and improvements of 
the nation’s air transportation system (FAA AIP Sponsor Guide-100. Airports Division 
Central Region, 2013).   
If the airport enplaned 2,500 passengers or more per year, then it was 
considered a “commercial service airport”, but if the enplanements fell short of 2,500, 
then the airport was considered a “general aviation airport” (GA) airport (Young & Wells, 
2011).  The FAA went as far as breaking the commercial service airports up into 
subcategories according to the most prevalent type of services provided at the facilities, 
which identified them as “air carrier” airports or “commuter” airports under the 
commercial service airport umbrella.  By the end of the NASP in 1982, a total of 780 
commercial service airports (635 air carrier + 145 commuter) and 2,423 GA airports 
were included in the plan (Young & Wells, 2011).  The Nation’s air transportation 
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system was growing by leaps and bounds, and a new national plan of airports became 
necessary in order to keep up with the growth.   
With the passage of the Airport and Airway Trust Act of 1982, the NASP was 
superseded by the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS), which became 
effective by 1984 (Young & Wells, 2011).  According to the FAA, the NPIAS is a report, 
which is required to be filed every two years with Congress and the public, and it 
provides a comprehensive list of airports included in the national system and provides 
information about their eligibility for federal funding and the amounts available over a 5 
year period (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).  In order to accommodate the 
growth of the airport system and to appropriately reallocate the federal funds to airport 
needs, the NPIAS re-classified the airport system into four main categories: 1) primary 
airports, 2) commercial service airports, 3) GA airports, and 4) reliever airports (Young 
& Wells, 2011).  As of the 2014 NPIAS, 3,345 (3,331 existing and 14 proposed) public 
use airports in the nation are included in the NPIAS because they play an important role 
in the infrastructure, and meet the FAA’s criteria to be included in the plan (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2014).    
Commercial service airports are included, and they handle the nation’s 
scheduled air carrier service, and “the goal of commercial service airports, of course, is 
to provide for the safe and efficient movement of passengers and cargo between 
population centers through the nation’s aviation system” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 12).  
Primary airports are those commercial service airports which accommodate 10,000 
passengers or more on an annual basis, but some primary airports receive many more 
enplanements than others.  To account for this, the FAA subcategorized the primary 
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airports as large hubs, medium hubs, small hubs, and nonhubs based upon 
enplanement counts (Young & Wells, 2011).   
Airports that accommodate less than 2,500 passengers per year are the nation’s 
GA and reliever airports.  Many, but not all, non-commercial service airports are also 
included in the NPIAS because they provide the facilities needed for miscellaneous 
aeronautical operations such as flight training and they also help to relieve congestion 
at the busiest commercial service airports.  Reliever airports are located less than 50 
miles from primary airports (Young & Wells, 2011).  Waukegan National Airport is a 
reliever airport, located 35 miles north of Chicago, which absorbs traffic from Chicago 
O’Hare International Airport.  (Waukegan Airport, 2015).        
The 2015–2019 NPIAS reflects the FAA’s need for total capital expenditure in 
the next five years as $33.5 billion (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).  The airports 
included in the NPIAS will be those which receive funding through the Airport 
Improvement Program (AIP).  Airports must be part of the NPIAS in order to receive AIP 
funds (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).        
AIP Funding 
The AIP is a federal government grant program, which contributes to the 
improvements of airport facilities within the Nation’s airport system, and provides 
financial assistance to airports for the purposes of planning, development, capacity 
enhancement, and noise compatibility programs which the airports cannot afford within 
their own financial structure (Young & Wells, 2011).  A limit has been set on the types 
of projects which are eligible for this funding, and in the FAA’s AIP Sponsor Guide, a list 
of examples is presented which includes projects that do not qualify for AIP such as 
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landscaping, artwork, parking facilities, airport operational costs such as salaries, or 
exclusive use areas such as Fixed Base Operator (FBO) areas within the airport apron 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2013).  “Because the demand for AIP funds exceeds 
the availability, the FAA bases distribution of limited AIP funds on current national 
priorities and objectives.  Projects that rate a high priority will receive higher 
consideration for funding over those projects with lower priority ratings” (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2013, p. 100-2).  According to the last re-authorization from the 
FAA at the end of June 2013, eligible primary airports can be provided with federal 
funds for 75 percent of the costs of a project (one exception - 80 percent for noise 
program implementation), but the remaining 20 or 25 percent must come from state and 
local funds, bond issues, or airport revenues (FAA AIP Sponsor Guide-100. Airports 
Division Central Region, 2013).  “Funds granted to airports by the AIP are provided in 
three different funding categories:  entitlement, set-aside, and discretionary funds” 
(Young & Wells, 2011, p. 342). 
In a nutshell, of the three types of funds, entitlement funds are the largest, 
accounting for about 50 percent of all AIP funds distributed and these are appropriated 
based on the number of passenger enplanements the airport has per year (Young & 
Wells, 2011).  Next, the “set-side funds are available to any eligible airport sponsor and 
are allocated according to congressionally mandated requirements for a number of 
different set-aside subcategories” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 343.)  Congress allocates 
the set-aside funds based upon specific needs of specific areas in the nation, and the 
areas with the most need will benefit first (Young & Wells, 2011).  And last, but not 
least, the discretionary funds are granted by the FAA in order to accomplish the goals 
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of Congress such as improving safety, increasing security, and increasing the capacity 
capabilities of an airport.  These funds are distributed to projects which are the highest 
priority to complete (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013).  
 The federal government issues federal letters of intent (LOI) as a statement in 
writing, which promulgates the FAA’s intent to provide federal funding for approved 
airport projects (Young & Wells, 2011).  “Projects are prioritized according to their 
function: 1) airport safety and security; 2) preservation of existing infrastructure; 3) aid 
compliance with governmental standards (e.g., noise migration); 4) upgrade of service; 
5) increase in airport system capacity” (Young & Wells, 2011, pg. 345).  A LOI is not 
always a dependable source of revenue as it is not a promise from the FAA that they 
will definitely provide the funds.  If Congress cuts the federal budget, or an airport fails 
to meet their projected level of enplanements, then the AIP discretionary funding may 
be cut.  For this reason, airport managers should not fully depend on an LOI that they 
receive, however, LOI’s can provide a basis for airports to borrow funds or issue bonds 
(Young & Wells, 2011).        
For many years, the AIP funding was enough to sustain the Nation’s airport 
system, but that began to change in the late 1980’s as the need for growth continued.  
As the federal dollars were stretched more and more, shortages in funding became 
more and more prevalent, and the need for additional funding became quite obvious.  
As a result, Congress passed the Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990, 
which gave publicly owned airports the right to charge fees for passengers boarding 
aircraft (enplaned passengers), called Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) (Young & 
Wells, 2011).  Enplaned passengers are defined as “the total number of revenue 
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passengers boarding aircraft, including originating, stopover, and transfer passengers, 
in scheduled and nonscheduled services” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 532).        
Passenger Facility Charges 
Passenger Facility Charges were developed under Federal Aviation Regulation 
(FAR) Part 158 as a supplementary form of capital for financing airport development 
when shortages in traditional funding through the AIP occurred (Young & Wells, 2011).  
Airport sponsors (public agencies that control a commercial service airports) must apply 
to the FAA, be approved for, and impose PFC’s in accordance with FAR Part 158 as 
applicable to specific airport type, projects, and need (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2014).  According to the FAA, “No public agency may impose a PFC under this part 
unless authorized by the Administrator” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, pg. 6).  
In FAR Part 158, it states that the dollar amounts which can be charged include $1.00, 
$2.00, or $3.00 for projects which “(1) preserve or enhance safety, security, or capacity 
of the national air transportation system; (2) reduce noise or mitigate noise impacts 
resulting from an airport; or (3) furnish opportunities for enhanced competition between 
or among air carriers” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, p. 9).  Also, a $4.00 or 
$4.50 PFC can be assessed if a project meets the same requirements outlined above 
as well as “if the project will make significant contribution to improving air safety and 
security, increasing competition among air carriers, reducing current or anticipated 
congestion, or reducing the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airport” 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014, p. 11).   
Projects which are financed with PFC’s are required to be included in the 
airport’s latest airport layout plan, which already contains an FAA approval for that 
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particular project (Federal Aviation Administration, 2014).  PFC’s can be very useful 
sources of revenue for airport sponsors and can even be used to support a bond issue.  
“PFC revenue can finance the entire allowable cost of a project or can be used to pay 
debt service or related expenses for bonds issued to fund an eligible project.  A PFC is 
considered local revenue and may be used to meet the non-federal share of projects 
funded under the AIP” (Young & Wells, 2011, p. 344.)  Airport management must 
specify the projects, and these projects must be part of the airport’s FAA approved 
Airport Master Plan or Airport Improvement Plan in order to be funded before issuing 
the PFC’s, and the PFC’s must be used with caution.  There is a possiblity that the 
revenue generated from PFC’s can be unstable at times due to lower than projected 
enplanements, if an airline files for bankruptcy, or if an airline shifts operations away 
from that airport and fails to fulfill its financial obligations (Young & Wells, 2011).  
State / Local Funding / Bonds 
State grants are offered by state departments of transportation.  These grants are 
typically allowed to fund approximately 90 percent of a project at an airport in the state 
of domicile and the airport sponsor is left with the remaining debt obligation.  This state 
grant funding is typically derived from a general tax base as well as highway tolls, 
automobile registrations, fuel taxes, and other miscellaneous fees (Young & Wells, 
2011).    
After airport sponsors exhaust their federal, state, and local funding, their largest 
source of airport financing reverts to bond financing as PFCs and AIP funding is simply 
not enough to subsidize all airport capital needs (Kaps, 2000).  According to the FAA, 
more than $18 billion in bonds were issued in the year 2011 (FAA National Plan of 
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Integrated Airport Systems 2013-2017, 2012).  The bonds that are most commonly 
used by airport sponsors include:  general obligation bonds (GOB), general airport 
revenue bonds (GARB), and special facilities bonds  (Young & Wells, 2011).   
GOB’s are issued by the municipality that owns and operates the airport and the 
debt is secured by the full faith and credit of citizens of the community via taxation 
(Kaps, 2000).  “General obligation bonds are the responsibility of the citizenry of a 
particular locality to repay the amount borrowed”  (Kaps, 2000, p. 256).   
GARB’s are an additional type of bond issue that airports may utilize to fund 
projects.  This type of bond differs from the GOB as the debt obligation under a GARB 
rests soley upon the airport sponsor,and is not backed by any additional subsidy such 
as taxes from the general public in the taxing district  (Kaps, 2000). 
Special Facility Bonds, also known as Self-Liquidating General Obligation Bonds, 
are backed by the citizenry just as GOBs are, however, there is a difference in 
repayment methods.  The repayment of a Special Facility Bond is accomplished 
throught the use of revenue from the indebted facility (Kaps, 2000).  One of the most 
familiar, general examples of this is a toll road.  When cars drive over the newly 
constructed roadway they must pay a toll.  After years of toll collection (revenue) from 
use of that roadway, the debt is repayed in full.  The same practice is utilized at airports 
for new runways, terminal buildings, etc.  When airlines land on the new runway, there 
is a landing fee instated and those revenues from the landing fees help to pay back the 
debt the airport sponsor incurred as a result of constructing that new runway (Kaps, 
2000).      
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Airport Use Agreements and Financial Management Methodology 
Official documentation is needed in order to identify exactly what a commercial 
service airport is financially responsible for and what the air carriers are financially 
responsible for.  A contract commonly referred to as an Airport Use Agreement is drawn 
up, and this describes the terms and conditions as well as the rights and responsibilities 
of the air carriers’ use of the airport (Wells & Young, 2004).  Many of the items in this 
agreement include:  leases for the use of the airfield, leases of terminal facilities, the 
calculations for the rates that the airport will charge the air carrier and even an outline of 
the air carriers’ privileges or rights when financial decisions are being made for 
development projects at the airport (Wells & Young, 2004).   
As previously mentioned, airport managers employ financial management 
methodologies in order to manage the revenues derived from these airport use 
agreements and to adhere to airport financial accounting practices.  Either the residual 
or compensatory financial management methodology can be employed, or a 
combination of the two.  There is no legal requirement stating that airport sponsors 
must use a certain methodology, but these methods are a great way for airport 
sponsors to control how revenues will be generated and utilized to ensure an airport 
meets its break-even need (Kaps, 2000).  
Residual Financial Management Method 
The residual financial management method is often used at many of the larger 
commercial service airports.  This method allows for one or more airlines that provide 
service to the airport to assume a large portion of the airport’s financial risk via the 
airport use agreement (Wells & Young, 2004).  The financial risks placed upon the air 
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carrier include making up the difference for any deficit that the airport may find itself in 
after exhausting all other revenue streams such as automobile parking, terminal 
concessions, and any other identified revenue streams (Wells & Young, 2004).    
Inception of the residual method occurred back in the 1950’s with the city of 
Chicago’s O’Hare Field making an agreement with United Airlines for a period of 50 
years.  The agreement stated that the airport would generate all of the revenue that it 
possibly could from all of its other airport users, but whatever airport expenditures 
exceeded their revenues for the year would be paid by United Airlines (Wells & Young, 
2004).  This agreement basically served as an insurance policy for the airport, and if the 
airport spent more than it was supposed to, then United Airlines would pay the tab to 
make sure that the airport met its break-even need.  Airports using the residual method 
are guaranteed to break-even. 
Long-term agreements were used quite frequently before the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978.  Air carriers were flying specifically planned routes and using 
preferred airports as a central location, or “hub” as defined by the air carriers, for 
transferring passengers known as the “hub and spoke” system (Young & Wells, 2011).  
After deregulation, the air carriers were competing, and many were less likely to stay at 
one airport for a long period of time.  Deregulation made it easy for the air carriers to 
enter and exit the airport market (AAAE, 2011).  This made the residual method less 
likely to be used because these residual agreements depended on the financial stability 
of the air carriers, and in a deregulated environment, they were no longer financially 
stable (AAAE, 2011).   
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Following deregulation, there has been a trend among airport managers in 
diversifying their revenues.  After this started taking place, many airports have switched 
to another financial management practice called the compensatory financial 
management method.  Some airports even use a combination or hybrid of the two 
methodologies because airport revenues are all about how costs are defined in the 
agreements (AAAE, 2011).   
Compensatory Financial Management Method 
The compensatory financial management method became the most commonly 
used approach, post deregulation, because airports could no longer count on airlines to 
provide dependable revenues under the residual methodology.  Airport managers 
started gaining interest in the use of the compensatory method because it allows for 
more flexibility and control, with shorter terms on leases and use agreements (AAAE, 
2011).  Under the compensatory agreement between air carriers and the airport, the 
airport assumes the financial risks of operations and not the air carrier (Wells & Young, 
2004).  The airport is responsible for making sure that their expenditures do not exceed 
their revenues (AAAE, 2011).  The air carriers are not responsible for ensuring that the 
airport meets its debt service requirements and break-even need for the year, as the 
residual methodology did.  The air carriers are held responsible for paying their rent for 
the use of space at the facility, and may also be charged landing fees for the use of the 
facility as a part of the total compensatory package (Wells & Young, 2004).     
Ultimately, airport sponsors are responsible for ensuring the airport continues to 
operate smoothly, and financial planning is one of the biggest factors to consider, 
especially when dealing with several variables that can come into play when dealing 
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with public budgeting and the volatility of the aviation industry.  Airlines are merging and 
changing their hubs, and according to the ACRP, “with costs of construction increasing, 
airlines filing for bankruptcy, and periodic economic downturns affecting the industry, 
airport operators find themselves continually looking for additional revenue sources to 
fund capital projects and sustain operations” (Airport Cooperative Research Program, 
2007, p. 24).  This is exactly the position that Lambert St. Louis International Airport 
found itself in, especially after TWA went bankrupt and American Airlines assumed 
TWA’s responsiblities under the airport use agreement set to expire in December 2005.  
American formed AMR Sub Corporation to fulfill the obligations of the use agreement 
until expiration, but shortly after forming AMR Sub, decided to reduce their St. Louis 
hub operation in 2003 and reduced the amount of service offered from over 400 flights 
per day to 200 with 50-60 of those flights conducted via Amerian mainline as part of 
their “turnaround plan” as they focused their efforts on growing their hub operations in 
Chicago and Dallas/Fort Worth.  And in 2009, American went a step further, closing 
their hub at Lambert. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY OF LAMBERT ST. LOUIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
The City of St. Louis, Missouri owns and operates the Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport as a self-sufficient enterprise fund (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003).  According to the AAAE, “An airport operated 
completely by a municipality, such as a city or county, means that the airport is a 
division or department of the city or county”  (AAAE, 2011, p. 17.)  There are both 
advantages and disadvantages to this type of ownership.  According to AAAE, “the 
advantage of an airport being municipally owned is that the airport administration has 
access to the resources of other city or county departments.  These resources may 
exceed what the airport’s administration could justify if it operated on a stand-alone 
basis”  (AAAE, 2011, p. 19.)  “The disadvantage of a municipally owned airport is that in 
times of financial constraints, the airport is often viewed as a liability or suffers 
corresponding budget reductions or personnel restrictions (such as mandatory furlough 
days) as other departments in the local government.  Airports are also competing for 
the same attention and leadership consideration as other departments or divisions with 
the municipal government”  (AAAE, 2011, p. 19.)   
Lambert St. Louis International Airport’s finances are separate from that of the 
City of St. Louis itself.  Even so, the Airport Authority saw itself through some interesting 
times as airline operations fluctuated as a result of external factors, which had an affect 
on main sources of revenue.  Lambert was in the process of completing a new runway 
project which the FAA had filed its Record of Decision in 1998 allowing the project to 
begin under Phase I of the Airport Development Program ($1.1 billion), with projected 
completion in 2006 (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  During the 
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project, several factors worked against them including September 11
th
, the economic 
recessions, and American Airlines’ reduction of service as well as the expiration their 
airport use agreement in 2005 with American Airlines (originally TWA).  As a result of 
those factors, Lambert dealt with its biggest concern, fluctuating airline operations 
which impacted airline revenues, AIP Funding, and PFCs.  According to the airport 
consultant, funding for the new runway was supposed to come mainly from GARBs, 
PFC revenues for the purpose of backing bonds and pay-as-you-go revenues, and AIP 
grants (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).   
Unfortunately for Lambert, the USGAO’s way of determining an airports’ financial 
strength was by the number and scale of underlying bond ratings provided by bond-
rating agencies (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14).  
Lambert’s PFCs were fluctuating and the credit rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s 
Investors Service, and Standard and Poor’s use PFCs to evaluate passenger traffic 
(enplanements) and airport financial strength and credit.  According to the airport 
consultant, Fitch and Moody’s placed Lambert on their negative watch list right after 
September 11
th
 because they were concerned about the reduced amount of 
enplanements which also meant reduced PFC revenue (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003).  The consultant went on to say “A downgrade to STL’s 
credit rating could affect the City’s ability to access the bond market for more GARBs to 
complete the funding of the runway program in light of potential shortfall in PFC 
PAYGO funding for the project” (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003, 
p. 40). Lambert’s credit was already under review by the credit rating agencies following 
September 11, 2001, when, immediately following American’s announcement to reduce 
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service in 2003, all three credit rating agencies dropped the Lambert’s credit rating, and 
placed the airport on their watch lists for further negative action in the future (John F. 
Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).   
This hit the airport when it needed it’s financial strength the most as the runway 
project was not supposed to be completed until 2006.  The airport management had to 
handle the impact of each external factor the best way they could.  After September 
11
th
 Lambert’s airport management conducted a reassessment of the five-year capital 
needs of the airport.  The decision was made to only move forward with projects which 
were considered essential to the safe operation of the airport or that would allow for 
more revenue generation such as long-term parking facilities or construction of 
additonal space for concessionaires (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 
2003).  The airport management also took steps such as refinancing bonds to take 
advantage of lower interest rates and deferred around $76 million in project costs in 
their Capital Improvement Program (CIP) until 2004 or later.  The National Bureau of 
Economic Research officially named March, 2001 to November, 2001 as well as 
December, 2007 to June, 2009 as recession periods (National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2011).  The latter was considered to be the greatest recession in length, with 
a total of 18 months, since World War II  (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2011).  
Lambert had an airport use agreement with Trans World Airlines (TWA) which 
became effective on August 1, 1965 and the carrier was Lambert’s primary hub carrier 
for many years (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  TWA filed for 
bankruptcy three separate times within nine years and sought protection under the 
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Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code in January of 1992, again in June of 1995, and the 
final time in January of 2001  (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  
In the third round, TWA sold all of its assets to American Airlines, and through this 
absorbtion of assets as well as other contracts and agreements with St. Louis, 
American formed AMR Sub Corporation named in order to operate as a “transitional 
airline” which gave it the ability to assume the remainder of TWA’s airport use 
agreement with Lambert which was set to expire on December 31, 2005.  The airport 
had a compensatory rate collection practice and an antiquated airline use agreement in 
place (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).     
 AMR Sub Corporation started operating as the transitional airline on April 10, 
2001, and by July 16, 2003 American Airlines decided to reduce the amount of service 
they offered out of the St. Louis hub because they wanted to focus on building stronger 
hub operations in Chicago and Dallas/Fort Worth.  According to the airport consultant, 
American (originally TWA) had a total of 473 daily departures from Lambert which 
accounted for approximately 78 percent of all enplaned passengers at Lambert since 
the 1990’s (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  American intially 
started with a 20% cutback in the number of flights they would be offering, and by 
November of 2003 the airline had cut service down by 50% (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003).  Not only that, but of the flights remaining at St. Louis, 
the airport consultant estimated the total number of connecting passengers would 
decline over 70 percent due to American’s reduction of mainline service and 
enplanements because of the use of smaller regional airline aircraft.  The consultant 
went on to say that, “if American does not restore service levels or if another airline 
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does not establish a major hub operation at STL, it is likely that substaintial amounts of 
terminal space will remain unleased after 2005”  (John F. Brown Airport Management 
Associates, 2003, p. 39.)  This was detrimental to Lambert’s financial situation as the 
Authority was dependent upon that revenue. 
 In this time period, Lambert found itself in the middle of a new runway project 
which was designed to allow dual independent aircraft arrivals during poor weather 
conditions, and improve airport efficiency with a cost projected to be $1.1 billion (John 
F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  The airport was dependent upon 
revenue from the airlines using their facility to pay for this project, and they were relying 
especially hard on American Airlines to pay their debt service payments on GARBs, 
PFC-supported GARBs, PFC pay-as-you-go revenues (PAYGO), and other internally 
generated revenues  (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).   
According to the ACRP, Lambert “has compensatory rate-making for its airline 
terminals and residual rate-setting for its landing fees”  (Airport Cooperative Research 
Program, 2009, p. 9.)  As previously stated, “under the residual method, the financial 
risk is tranferred to the airlines in return for a negotiated limit on an airport’s profits”  
(AAAE, 2011, p. 72.)  But, if the airline, American Airlines in this case, was not providing 
the projected amount of service (landings and enplaned passengers) to Lambert, then 
there was obviously going to be a reduction in the amount of revenue generated by the 
airline. 
In FY 2002, the revenue generated from American and TWA amounted to 69 
percent of the overall revenue from the airlines at Lambert, and 45 percent of the total 
operating revenue for the airport overall (John F. Brown Airport Management 
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Associates, 2003).  This meant that there was going to be less airline revenue as a 
result of fewer PFCs being collected and less terminal space being occupied, and this 
meant the Authority was going to have difficulty paying the debt service on their GARBs  
(John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).   In 2003, the City of St. Louis 
estimated their total PFC revenue needed to pay debt service on their PFC eligible debt 
paid toward bond principal to be about $20 million per year.  Also, in 2003, they 
estimated their total PFC revenue to be around $53 million (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003). 
At the time the case study was conducted, the airport consultant said “the debt 
service for the new runway will become payable from airport revenues after the existing 
use agreements expire, placing further pressure on airline unit costs at that time, 
especially the landing fee rate, which would become one of the highest in the nation” 
(John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  Subsequent to the December 
31, 2005 expiration of the airport use agreement with AMR Sub Corporation, Lambert 
had to make adjustments to their revenue structure because the costs associated with 
the operations of the new runway entered the airline rate base (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003).  Lambert’s airport management had to diversify their 
revenues accordingly, meaning that adjustments to other forms of revenue such as 
landing fees and terminal use fees accrued from all airlines using the airport would 
have to make up for the deficit (John F. Brown Airport Management Associates, 2003).  
It also helped that the FAA provided Lambert with a LOI, stating that it would provide 
141.4 million under the AIP and the FAA also approved Lambert’s use of $900 million in 
PFC revenue to fund the runway project (John F. Brown Airport Management 
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Associates, 2003).   
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CHAPTER 6 - FINDINGS 
In a perfect world, meeting break-even need and achieving airport financial 
prosperity are the goals of every airport manager.  As previously discussed, many 
factors play a critical role in achieving those goals.  One of the most important factors 
is/are the airport use agreement(s) that the airport has in place with airlines offering 
service at that airport.  Airline derived revenue contributes significantly not only toward 
the costs of operating and maintaining the airport, but also with improvements such as 
building a new runway like at Lambert St. Louis International Airport.  However, in 
reality, both controllable factors such as runway projects, as well as uncontrollable 
factors such as economic recessions can have an impact on airport finances as 
discussed in the case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport.  Airport 
managers must make adjustments to their financial management methodology in order 
to maintain airport financial strength in both good times and bad.  These methodologies 
provide airport managers with an effective way to manage financial resources available 
to their airport (Young & Wells, 2011).  The case study of Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport provided excellent examples of controllable and uncontrollable 
factors, or external events, which had the potential to affect airport revenue related to 
airline operations at Lambert such as PFC’s.   
Those events facilitated the subsequent discussion of Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport’s Operation Numbers, Revenue, AIP Funding, and PFC’s, and are 
examined to see if any fluctuations in these variables could be linked to external events 
including September 11
th
, the economic recession from March to November 2003, the 
economic recession from December 2007 to June 2009, and the reductions in 
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American Airlines’ hub service in 2003 and 2009.  This data is examined and discussed 
with the goal of finding answers to the following research questions regarding whether 
or not the major external events had an effect on the financial strength of Lambert St. 
Louis International Airport from 1999-2013.  
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September 11th 
Did September 11
th
 affect the Operations at Lambert St. Louis International 
Airport? 
 
Figure 1-A.  Lambert Operations 
Source:  FAA 
Yes, the number of operations at Lambert were clearly affected by September 
11
th
.  In fact, the number of operations at Lambert as well as the number of operations 
nationally both dropped significantly in 2001 as a result of the tragedy.  However, the 
number of operations do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the 
fluctuations in operations as a result of September 11
th
 affected the financial strength of 
Lambert.       
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Did September 11
th
 affect the Revenue generated at Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport?   
 
Figure 2-A.  Lambert Revenue 
Source:  FAA 
September 11
th
 did not cause fluctuations in the revenue generated at Lambert.  
The revenues did not increase quite as much as in previous years, but a gradual 
increase in revenue still existed between the years 2001 and 2002.  Furthermore, the 
amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in revenue as a result of September 11
th
 affected the 
financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did September 11
th
 affect the AIP Funding at Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport?   
 
Figure 3-A.  Lambert AIP Funding 
Source:  FAA 
September 11
th
 did not affect the AIP Funding for Lambert.  A steady increase in 
the funding appears to have existed from 2001 to 2002, almost leveling off in 2003. 
It appears that the runway project was the governing force when it came to the 
amount of AIP funding awards at Lambert.  The year 2003 was the peak year for 
funding the runway project, and this graph makes that very clear.  Then there is a 
steady downward trend until 2006 as a result of the funding tapering off after 
completion of the runway project.  Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not 
provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP 
Funding as a result of September 11
th
 affected the financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did September 11
th
 affect the PFC Funding at Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport?   
 
Figure 4-A.  Lambert PFC Funding 
Source:  FAA 
September 11
th
 did have a short-lived affect on the number of PFC’s collected at 
Lambert.  And, as previously stated in the research, bond rating agencies Fitch and 
Moody’s both placed Lambert on their negative watch list right after September 11
th
 for 
fear of a reduced amount of passenger enplanements (John F. Brown Airport 
Management Associates, 2003).   
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Economic Recession from March to November 2001 
Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the 
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 1-B.  Lambert Operations 
Source:  FAA 
Based upon this data, and the previously presented research, it is unclear 
whether or not the economic recession itself had a negative impact on the operation 
numbers at Lambert during the last half of 2001, or if it was as a result of September 
11
th
, or a combination of the two events. Furthermore, the number of operations do not 
provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations in operations as a result 
of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected the financial 
strength of Lambert.       
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the 
Revenue at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 2-B.  Lambert Revenue 
Source:  FAA 
The economic recession in 2001 may be the reason why revenues appear to 
have almost flattened out from 2001 to 2002 with only a gradual increase that existed, 
but it is unclear whether or not the economic recession itself had a negative impact on 
the revenue at Lambert during the last half of 2001, or if it was as a result of September 
11
th
, or a combination of the two events.  Furthermore, the amount of revenue 
generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations in 
revenue as a result of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected 
the financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the AIP 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 3-B.  Lambert AIP Funding 
Source:  FAA 
No, the economic recession of 2001 does not seem to have affected AIP funding 
for Lambert.  A slight increase in funding seems to have existed. 
Once again, it appears that the runway project was the governing force when it 
came to the amount of AIP funding awards at Lambert.  The year 2003 was the peak 
year for funding the runway project, and this graph makes that very clear.  Then there is 
a steady downward trend until 2006 as a result of the funding tapering off after 
completion of the runway project.  Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not 
provide sufficient information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP 
Funding as a result of the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affected 
the financial strength of Lambert.  
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Did the Economic Recession from March to November 2001 affect the PFC 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 4-B.  Lambert PFC Funding 
Source:  FAA 
Yes, based on this data, the economic recession of 2001 appears to have had 
an affect on the number of PFC’s collected at Lambert, but, again, it is more likely that 
the drop in the number of operations can be attributed to September 11
th
, or a 
combination of the two events.  
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Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 
Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the 
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 1-C.  Lambert Operations 
Source:  FAA 
Based on this data, the economic recession from December 2007 to June 2009 
did not affect the number operations that took place at Lambert.  This economic 
recession occurred around the same time that American Airlines was reducing 
operations and closing their hub at Lambert.  However, no drop in Lambert operation 
numbers existed for the period of December 2007 to June 2009.  Also, according to the 
research previously presented, the consistency of operations for the period of 
December 2007 to June 2009 was most likely attributed to AirTran Airways’ new 
presence at Lambert, with operations that started in May of 2007.  According to 
Lambert St. Louis International Airport, AirTran served more than 197,000 passengers 
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out of a total of 15.38 million passengers (boardings and arrivals) by the end of 2007 
(Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2008).  Furthermore, the number of operations 
do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack thereof, in 
operations as a result of the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 
affected the financial strength of Lambert.    
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the 
Revenue at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 2-C.  Lambert Revenue 
Source:  FAA 
Yes, during the economic recession of 2007 to 2009, it appears that there was a 
decline in revenues from 2007 to 2008, followed by another steady revenue increase 
from 2008 to 2009, with no sustained affect on revenue at Lambert.  After the 2005 
expiration of the airline lease agreement, a debt stabilization fund was established, and 
was funded incrementally from 2007 – 2011 from unused revenue fund money 
(Standard & Poors, 2006).  Also, most likely, Air Tran’s presence and expansion of 
operations impacted this.  According to Lambert St. Louis International Airport’s Director 
at that time, Richard Hrabko, in a media release on February 10, 2009, “Our 
passengers have really embraced AirTran Airways in the last two years because of its 
service and fares.” (Lambert St. Louis International Airport).  Furthermore, the amount 
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of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 
fluctuations in revenue as a result of the Economic Recession from December 2007 to 
June 2009 affected the financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the 
AIP Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 3-C.  Lambert AIP Funding 
Source:  FAA 
By looking at this data by itself, it appears that the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009 affected the AIP Funding at Lambert.  But the data is misleading, as the 
runway project was the governing force when it came to the amount of AIP funding 
awards at Lambert.  The year 2003 was the peak year for funding the runway project, 
and this graph makes that very clear.  Then there is a steady downward trend until 2006 
as a result of the funding tapering off after completion of the runway project followed by 
an increase from 2008 to 2009.  This data alone is inconclusive, and it appears that 
projects affected AIP Funding more than the economic recession.  Furthermore, the 
amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result of the Economic Recession 
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from December 2007 to June 2009 affected the financial strength of Lambert.  
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Did the Economic Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 affect the 
PFC Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 4-C.  Lambert PFC Funding 
Source:  FAA 
According to this data, yes, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 did affect 
the number of PFC’s collected at Lambert.  There appears to be a very slight decline in 
collections from 2007 to 2008, almost leveling off, but from 2008 to 2009 there was a 
decline in PFC collection at Lambert followed by another leveling out all the way to 
2013.     
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2003 Reduction in American Airlines’ Hub Service 
Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the 
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 1-D.  Lambert Operations 
Source:  FAA 
The drop in Lambert operation numbers in 2003 indicates that American Airlines’ 
reduction in service was responsible.  This drop in operations is supported by the 
research previously presented, because, American Airlines announced the reduction of 
hub service in July of 2003, which became effective in November 2003.  The data 
shows that Lambert was only involved as the national operation numbers did not seem 
to change nearly as drastically as Lambert’s.  Furthermore, the number of operations 
do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack thereof, in 
operations as a result of the reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affected the 
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financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the Revenue 
at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 2-D.  Lambert Revenue 
Source:  FAA 
The 2003 reduction of American Airlines’ service did not have a sustained affect 
the revenue at Lambert.  The peak of AIP funding awards (see figure 3) hit the airport in 
2003 as the revenues spiked, however, after that, the American Airlines’ reduction in 
service commencing in 2003 shows that there was a significant drop in revenues for the 
STL with an approximate 18 percent drop in revenue by the year 2005.  From 2005 on, 
based on the sharp increase in revenues depicted in this data, and based upon the 
research previously presented, the airport management made adjustments to Lambert’s 
landing fee calculations.  According to Standard  and Poors, after the 2005 expiration of 
the airline lease agreement, “the airport has been able to raise landing fees to offset 
lower activity levels to better cover expenses” (Standard & Poors, 2006).  Standard and 
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Poors went on to say that the airport was well managed, and “even though the airport 
experienced a steep decline in total enplanements following American Airlines’ 
dehubbing, it did not sustain a material drop in revenues” (Standard & Poors, 2006).  In 
2005, following the expiration of the airport use agreement with American Airlines, it 
appears that the airport management made some adjustments to their airline revenue 
calculations, and this could be the reason for the steady increase in revenue from 2005 
to 2007. Furthermore, the amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient 
information to conclude that fluctuations in revenue as a result of the 2003 reduction in 
American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.     
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the AIP 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 3-D.  Lambert AIP Funding 
Source:  FAA 
The American reduction of service in the year 2003 does not appear to affect the 
AIP funding in this graph, but, once again, this graph is not a true indication and is a 
false reading of AIP funding.  The AIP funding for the new runway just happened to be 
at its peak between 2003 and 2004 and this skewed the data because of the lag in 
funding awards.  This line is a steady downward trend after 2003.  Furthermore, the 
amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 
fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result of the 2003 reduction in 
American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.  
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Did the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the PFC 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 4-D.  Lambert PFC Funding 
Source:  FAA 
Yes, the amount of PFC’s collected at Lambert decreased significantly as a 
result of American Airline’s reduction in service in 2003.  This was particulary true 
between the years of 2003 to 2005.  The PFC’s collected dropped from $50,525,583 in 
2003 down to $27,164,387 in 2005 (author’s percentage change calculations).  That’s a 
drop of nearly 50%.  This data, even though a general overview, proves that the credit 
rating agencies had a right to be concerned.    
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2009 Reduction in American Airlines’ Hub Service 
Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the 
Operations at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 1-E.  Lambert Operations 
Source:  FAA 
Yes, the 2009 reductions in American Airlines’ hub service did cause a drop in 
the operations at Lambert, and lasted until the beginning of 2011.  In the 2004-2010 
period, American Airlines had a 200 flight per day hub in operation for the vast majority 
of the period, however, after September 2009, American Airlines cut the number of 
flights down from 200 per day to about 40 per day.  Furthermore, the number of 
operations do not provide sufficient information to conclude that the fluctuations, or lack 
thereof, in operations as a result of the reduction in American Airlines’ hub service 
affected the financial strength of Lambert.       
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the Revenue 
at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 2-E.  Lambert Revenue 
Source:  FAA 
Based on this data, the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service did not 
affect revenue at Lambert.  There may be a possible explanation for this though.  
Subsequent to the 2003 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service at Lambert, 
Standard and Poors said that “the airport has been able to raise landing fees to offset 
lower activity levels to better cover expenses” going on to say that the airport was well 
managed, and “even though the airport experienced a steep decline in passenger 
enplanements following American Airlines’ dehubbing, it did not sustain a material drop 
in revenues” (Standard & Poors, 2006).  And, according to Standard and Poors, after 
the 2005 expiration of the airline use agreement, a debt stabilization fund was 
established at Lambert, and was funded incrementally from 2007 to 2011 from unused 
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revenue fund money (Standard & Poors, 2006).  The debt stabilization fund appears to 
be the reason why the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service does not 
appear to have had an affect on revenue numbers at Lambert, at least until after 2010.  
Furthermore, the amount of revenue generated does not provide sufficient information 
to conclude that fluctuations in revenue as a result of the 2009 reduction in American 
Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of Lambert.      
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the AIP 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 3-E.  Lambert AIP Funding  
Source:  FAA 
No, the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service did not affect AIP 
funding.  Again, projects are the governing force for AIP funding awards at Lambert, 
and this graph is not a true indication of AIP funding fluctuations. The AIP funding for 
the new runway just happened to be at its peak between 2003 and 2004 and this 
skewed the data because of the lag in funding awards.  This line is a steady downward 
trend after 2003. Furthermore, the amount of AIP Funding does not provide sufficient 
information to conclude that fluctuations, or the lack thereof, in AIP Funding as a result 
of the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affected the financial strength of 
Lambert.  
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Did the 2009 reduction in American Airlines’ hub service affect the PFC 
Funding at Lambert St. Louis International Airport? 
 
Figure 4-E.  Lambert PFC Funding 
Source:  FAA 
Based on this data, no, the amount of PFC’s collected at Lambert were not 
affected by the American Airlines’ reduction in hub service in 2009.  The numbers 
remain fairly consistent from 2009 forward, with a slight increase until 2012.         
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
Securing an airports financial strength means having a well-balanced airport 
financial management strategy in place in order to ensure an airport meets break-even 
need during good times and bad.  Airport sources of revenue, especially revenue 
related to airlines must be managed with care at all times.  Just as the events 
previously described in the case study of Lambert St. Louis International Airport, this 
was especially true for Lambert as the major external events including September 11
th
,  
the economic recession from March – November 2001, the economic recession from 
December 2007 – June 2009, and the 2003 and 2009 reductions in American Airlines’ 
hub service at Lambert all caused fluctuations in the Operations, Revenue, AIP 
Funding, and PFC Funding from 1999-2013 at Lambert.  All of it had the potential to 
interfere with Lambert’s financial strength during the time they were trying to complete 
their new runway project.    
As described in the findings, the analysis performed and the answers to the 
research questions failed prove that fluctuations in the variables actually affected the 
financial strength of Lambert.  Overall, the data provided inconclusive results, with all 
variables except for PFC’s rendered completely irrelevant.  For example, September 
11
th
 may have caused fluctuations in the number of Operations that occurred at 
Lambert, however, those fluctuations in Operations did not necessarily result in an 
effect on the financial strength of Lambert.  No proof exists.  The research did, 
however, reveal that PFC’s are very important!  As described earlier in the literature 
review, the bond-rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s Investor Service, and Standard 
and Poor’s use PFC’s in order to evaluate passenger traffic (enplanements) and airport 
55 
financial strength and credit.  And the Government Accountability Office (GAO) backed 
this by saying “A good indicator of airports’ financial strength is the number and scale of 
underlying bond ratings provided by bond-rating agencies” (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2007, p. 14).  Further research is highly recommended on PFC’s 
and bond ratings and their respective effects on airport financial strength.     
It can be assumed that the financial actions taken by Lambert such as 
refinancing their bonds, creating the debt stabilization fund, and making adjustments to 
their landing fees, for example, helped the airport to maintain its financial strength from 
1999-2013.  In fact, on June 23, 2011 Lambert’s credit rating was changed by Moody’s 
Investor Service from a Baa1 (negative outlook) to Baa1 (stable outlook), and Standard 
and Poor’s rated Lambert at A- (negative outlook) which was even higher than Moody’s 
(Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2011).  And two years later, things improved 
even more.  As of May of 2013, Moody’s improved Lambert’s rating from Baa1 (stable 
outlook) to A3 (stable outlook), and Standard and Poor’s also improved their rating from 
A- (negative outlook) to A- (stable outlook) (Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 
2013).  According to Lambert’s newsroom, “This is the first time in more than a decade 
that both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings for the airport have both been in the 
single ‘A’ category” (Lambert St. Louis International Airport, 2013).  Based upon these 
credit ratings, and this research, it is safe to conclude that Lambert St. Louis 
International Airport was able to survive the volatility of the major external events from 
1999-2013 well, and has indeed maintained its financial strength.   
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